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RECENT DECISIONS
CIVIL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION - JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT DE-
TERMINED BY THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF PROPERLY JOINED CLAIMS. -
The Plaintiff filed a complaint containing five counts, the first four charg-
ing the defendant with assault and battery, the fifth with slander. Each of
the five counts claimed damages of $3,000, the maximum jurisdictional
amount allowed to the trial court. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-755 (1951).
The complaint was dismissed at pretrial since the aggregate claim was
$15,000. Appellant argued that each claim should be considered separate-
ly for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction was
not defeated by virtue of the total amount sought to be recovered since
the rules of the trial court permitted joinder of claims. Held, affirmed.
Joinder cannot be used to enlarge statutory jurisdiction, and the aggre-
gate amount of the claims exceeded. the jurisdictional limitation. Reeves
v. Yale Transp. Corp., 128 A.2d 792 (Munic. Ct. App.D.C. 1957).
The opinion concerns itself with two perpendicular notions: joinder
and jurisdiction. Joinder rules have been liberalized and serve as a pro-
cedural device by which multiple suits may be avoided. FED. R. CIrv. P. 18
(a); see Leimer v. Woods, 196 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1952). However, the
rules can not be construed to extend or limit jurisdiction of the court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 82. Jurisdiction may be limited by the amount in contro-
versy. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-755 (1951) ($3,000 maximum); 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1952) ($3,000 minimum).
State decisions reflect two contrary approaches in calculating the
amount in controversy where the complaint alleges more than one claim
or cause of action. Apparently the approaches are adopted without the
court first making a determination as to whether the language of the
statute is pitched in terms of minimum or maximum jurisdiction. Some
states prefer the use of the aggregate test, Hartford Min. Co. v. Home
Lumber & Coal Co., 61 Nev. 17, 114 P.2d 1093 (1941) ($3,000 mini-
mum jurisdiction); Marcus v. Bader, 156 Misc. 730, 282 N.Y.Supp. 503
(1935) ($3,000 maximum jurisdiction); Langham & Gentry v. Boggs,
1 Mo. 262 (1824) ($90 minimum jurisdiction), while others treat each
claim or cause of action separately, the aggregate notwithstanding. Deni-
son v. Denison, 16 Conn. 34 (1843) ($70 maximum jurisdiction); Berry
v. Linton, 1 Ark. 252 (1838) ($100 minimum jurisdiction). Thus it is
apparent that in each jurisdictional situation (maximum or minimum),
where the complaint alleges more than one claim or cause of action, the
court is faced with an identical problem, that is, whether the amount in
controversy is dependent upon each claim or cause of action considered
separately or the aggregate of all properly joined claims. Added problems
are presented with the use of counterclaims and cross claims. See Note,
Counterclaims in Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 44 HARv. L. REv. 273
(1930).
The federal courts appear to use the aggregate test when faced with
minimum jurisdiction statutes, even though the claims are separate and
distinct, Kimel v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 71 F.2d 921 (10th Cir.
1934) (dictum), but disregard that test when dealing with maximum
jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2) (1952).
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Oliver v. United States, 149 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1945). However, if it is
determined that the plaintiff is merely attempting to split a cause of action
jurisdiction is destroyed. Sutcliffe Storage & Warehouse Co., v. United
States, 162 F.2d 849 (1st Cir. 1947); LeJohn Mfg. Co. v. Webb, 91 A.2d
332 (Munic.Ct.App. D.C. 1952).
An evaluation of the two approaches necessitates a closer analysis of
the federal decisions in this area. The aggregation of separate and distinct
claims of several plaintiffs in order to exceed the minimum jurisdictional
amount is not allowed, Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939),
nor is aggregation by a single plaintiff against several defendants. Walter
v. Northeastern R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 370 (1893). But it is unequivocally
stated that "where the plaintiff has several demands which he may join
in one action, the aggregate of those demands.., is the amount in con-
troversy." Kimel v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., supra at 924 (dictum).
See also Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1940); MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 18.07 (2d ed. 1948, Supp. 1956). It would appear that where
only one plaintiff and one defendant are involved the federal courts are
construing the jurisdiction statute liberally, while the statute is strictly
construed where more than two parties are involved. Similar distinctions
have been made by state courts. E.g., Taylor v. Yellow Cab Co., 53 A.2d
691 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1947); Navarro v. Martin, 22 N.J. Misc. 291,
38 A.2d 691 (1944); Marcus v. Bader, supra.
There remains, however, the apparent conflict between the situation
presented in the instant case and that arising under the Tucker Act. The
act provides for original jurisdiction of claims against the United States
in any District Court where the sum in controversy does not exceed
$10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2) (1952). It has consistently been
held that separate claims, none of which is in excess of $10,000, can be
joined without the consequent loss of jurisdiction. United States v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R. Co., 221 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1955); Oliver v.
United States, supra; Sutcliffe Storage & Warehouse Co. v. United States,
supra (by implication). The decisions arising under the Tucker Act may
be reconciled with those adopting the aggregate test, as does the instant
case. The Tucker Act cases are peculiarly dependent upon the act's two-
fold purpose. The act was designed to accomodate plaintiffs with re-
latively small claims by allowing them to bring the action in their local
District Court, but also to retain exclusive jurisdiction in Washington
for claims in excess of $10,000 so that department heads may be pre-
sent to protect the interests of the government. Oliver v. United States,
supra. The practical harmlessness of favoring liberal joinder in this area
was accentuated by one court:
... We cannot believe that the head of a Department in Washington, who
does not need to consider each claim if pleaded in three separate suits, be-
comes interested if the three claims are pleaded in a single suit. Oliver
v. United States, supra at 729.
It appears the Tucker Act lends itself to a statutory interpretation which,
though not consonant with the established "aggregate" jurisdictional
amount test, is apparently the will of Congress.
The court in the instant case alludes to the federal courts' "two-test"
system; but not feeling any compulsion to follow the decisions of the
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federal courts in the exercise of their analogous limited jurisdiction under
the Tucker Act, the court clearly adopts the aggregate test. It is sub-
mitted, however, that the real meaning of the case is not so clear. The
plaintiff's complaint disclosed an obvious attempt to split a cause of action
for assault and battery, which is substantial ground for a dismissal. Com-
plaint for Damages, Civil Action, No. M21408-56, filed July 17, 1956.
The terse opinion fails to consider this infecting characteristic.
Nevertheless, the adoption of one test, applied consistently to both
jurisdictional maximum and minimum situations, is sound judicial policy.
The application of different tests would tend to make the choice of a
forum whimsical. Jurisdictional limits are in terms of "amount in con-
troversy" and should be dependent upon the total amount claimed by the
plaintiff under the liberal joinder of claims rule. In the more complex
situations the court need only be mindful of the nature of the claims,
whether they are separate and distinct, joint, or an attempt to split a
single cause of action-remembering the court's discretionary power to
consolidate or separate claims for trial, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 42, while
thinking in terms of the one proper court for the plaintiff.
Thomas B. McNeill
CIVIL PROCEDURE - NEW TRIAL - TIMELY MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT WILL NOT SUPPORT COURT ORDER FOR
NEW TRIAL AFTER TEN DAYS FROM ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. - In an
action for personal injuries plaintiff obtained a jury verdict against
defendant and judgment was entered for plaintiff. Defendant filed a
timely motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to
FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b), but failed to incorporate the alternative motion
for new trial, as permitted by the rule. Some weeks later the court denied
the motion for judgment n.o.v., but granted a new trial on its own in-
itiative. Plaintiff moved to set aside the order granting a new trial since
a timely motion for a new trial had not been filed and since the court,
in exercising its own initiative, failed to do so within ten days as provided
in FED. R. Civ. P. 59(d). The motion was denied and the plaintiff
appealed. Held, reversed. Where ten days has elapsed from entry of
judgment and the evidence does not warrant a judgment n.o.v., the trial
court is without jurisdiction to grant a new trial on its own initiative.
Jackson v. Wilson Trucking Corp., 243 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
The Supreme Court has viewed the alternative motion provision in
Rule 50(b) as an effective means for expediting litigation and preventing
unnecessary retrials. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan; 311 U.S.
243 (1940). Although there has been some problematical litigation con-
cerning the disposition of the alternative motions when both are pre-
sented, Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, supra; Marsh v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 175 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1949), the exact concern of the in-
stant case has failed to appear in such authoritative courts.
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Under FED. R. Civ. P. 59 (b), (d), a motion for a new trial must be
presented within ten days from entry of judgment, or the trial court,
acting on its own initiative, must order the new trial within this period.
See Greenwood v. Greenwood, 16 F.R.D. 366 (E.D. Pa. 1954), appeal
dismissed, 224 F.2d 318 (1955). The majority in the instant case held
that no new trial may be granted under a timely motion for judgment
n.o.v. pursuant to Rule 50(b) where the evidence is insufficient to
warrant judgment n.o.v., and that the ordering of a new trial under these
circumstances would be governed by Rule 59(d). Although it was un-
necessary to so decide, the court stated that it would permit a new trial
order under a timely motion for judgment n.o.v. if the evidence warranted
granting of the latter motion. By this admission the court assumes
postures of contradiction.
The useof alternative motions permitted by Rule 50(b) does not alter
the nature of the respective alternate motions; each is entitled to be
decided according to the principles applicable to it standing alone.
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, supra; Marsh v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
supra. It is well established that a motion for judgment n.o.v. requires
the court to determine a question of law. The verdict will be reconsidered
by the judge construing all evidence and conflicts in a light most favor-
able to the party not moving. See O'Day v. Chicago River & Indiana R.R.
Co., 216 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1954). In contradistinction the trial court
has great latitude of discretion when confronted with a motion for a new
trial. Here the trial court may act upon its opinion as to the weight of the
evidence or generally grant a new trial where it believes the ends of
justice so require. Snead v. New York Cent. R.R., 216 F.2d 169 (4th
Cir. 1954).
According to the majority opinion in the instant case, a trial court, when
granting a new trial for reasons aside from those stated in a timely
motion, is acting on its own initiative, Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199
F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 921 (1953); Freid v.
McGrath, 133 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1942), and should be restricted to the
ten day limit imposed by Rule 59(d). The majority fails to recognize
that the unrequested granting of a new trial by a court confronted with
a motion for judgment n.o.v., although there is sufficient reason to
support such a motion, is an act of discretion upon the court's own
initiative the same as granting a new trial for reasons other than those
contained in a timely motion. In granting a new trial where the evidence
would warrant a judgment n.o.v. the court is acting for reasons other
than those contained in the motion for judgment n.o.v., namely, that
the ends of justice would be better served by a new trial than judg-
ment n.o.v. By referring to this action as the power of lesser remedy the
court draws a distinction without a difference. In both instances the action
is upon the court's own initiative and to be consistent with the holding
in the instant case, should be controlled by Rule 59(d). This incongruous
position of the majority opinion a priori admits the fundamental pro-
position of the dissent that the granting of motions under Rule 50(b) can
be a discretionary prerogative of the trial court not controlled by Rule
59 (d). Rule 6(b), concerning the extension.of time for action under these
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particular rules, lends substance to this conclusion in that it explicitly
prohibits any extension of time under Rule 50(b) except under con-
ditions contained within the rule itself.
The dissent further argues that the majority is ignoring the spirit and
substance of the Federal Rules by a rigid and formal interpretation of
Rule 50(b). In 1946 the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Pro-
cedure offered amendments to Rule 50(b) which strongly suggest that
the trial court, when presented solely with a motion for judgment n.o.v.,
may grant the lesser remedy of a new trial if it is satisfied that a ter-
mination of the proceedings at that point would not serve the ends of
justice. See REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES at 62, 66
(1946); see also Rule 1 which states that the rules ".... shall be construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
FED. R. Crv. P. 1. Considering the question of appellate discretion under
Rule 50(b), the Supreme Court in Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper
Co., 330 U.S. 212 (1946), relied upon the committee report when
it mentioned that the rule does not compel a trial judge to enter judg-
ment n.o.v. instead of ordering a new trial, but permits him to exercise
an unfettered discretion to choose between the two alternatives. It should
be noted that in contrast to the majority in the instant case, the Supreme
Court preferred not to condition the new trial order upon the evidence
requirements for judgment n.o.v. The general proposition of the Supreme
Court is a desirable one as the trial judge can better exercise this discre-
tion with a fresh and personal knowledge of the issues and evidence in-
volved unhampered by rigid technicalities. The Advisory Committee on
Rules for Civil Procedure clarified their position in 1954 advising that a
motion for judgment n.o.v. be presumed to include the alternative motion
for a new trial. PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS at 42
(1954). Commenting on the proposed amendment the committee said,
"The amendment... should thus protect the rights of the parties without
resort to technical procedures. The addition... safeguards the reasonable
expectations of the lawyer without regard to a precise form of words." Id.
at 44. The situation envisioned by the committee is analogous to that
presented by the majority in the instant case when it grants the power
of lesser remedy. Upon this thesis the greater motion should include
the lesser.
The proposition is not without authority. Where one ground stated in
a motion for judgment n.o.v. is applicable only to a motion for a new trial
the court may deny the motion and grant a new trial. Gillis v. Reicks, 7
F.R.D. 205 (D.D.C. 1947). In Howard v. United States, 1 F.R.D. 361
(E.D. Tenn. 1940), where there was substantial evidence which, if
believed by the jury, would have entitled the plaintiff to verdict, the trial
court denied defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. under Rule 50(b)
and ordered a new trial. The Howard ruling is in direct opposition to the
supporting resolution of the majority in the instant case. Cf. Robinson v.
Isbrandtsen Co., 203 F.2d 514 (2nd Cir. 1953); but see Moomaw v.
Reading Co., 66 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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In states which allow alternative motions there is division. Minnesota
rejects the order for new trial pursuant to motion for judgment n.o.v.
unless the alternative motion is properly presented. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 605.06 (1947). When a motion for judgment n.o.v. is presented the
moving party waives all errors which would be grounds for a new trial.
Eichler v. Equity Farms, Inc., 194 Minn. 8, 259 N.W. 545 (1935); but
see Building Ass'n of Duluth Odd Fellows v. Van Nispen, 20 N.W.2d 90
(Minn. 1945). California explicitly states that the motion for a new trial
must be presented in the alternative or it shall be waived. See CAL. CODE
Civ. P. § 629 (1955). In Illinois the failure to include a motion for new
trial in a post trial motion is a waiver of the right to apply for a new trial
unless the jury failed to reach a verdict. ILL. ANrN. STAT. c. 110, § 68.1
(Smith-Hurd 1956). Pennsylvania apparently permits the trial court to
order a new trial where judgment n.o.v. is denied. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 682 (Purdon 1953); see March v. Philadelphia & West Chester Trac-
tion Co., 285 Pa. 413, 132 Atl. 355 (1926).
It would be presumptuous to say that the factual situation of the
instant case provided the frame of reference for the many commentaries,
and even decisions, concerning Rule 50(b). The general language of the
commentaries and absence of the decisive time factor in the decisions
provide a weak basis for a determinative resolution either way. These
opinions do, however, lend more to an interpretation of the purpose of
the Federal Rules rather than to specific requirements for their im-
plementation. In this respect the dissent is a more appropriate deduction
from authority. The technical inconsistency of the majority's attempt to
apply Rule 59(d) as a control device on Rule 50(b) demands an original
interpretation of the time limitations and discretionary powers inherent
in 50(b). If in the last analysis the problem is one of proper procedure in
arriving at a suitable remedy, the spirit of the Federal Rules would imply
that the remedy should control.
Patrick F. McCartan
CIVIL PROCEDURE - SEPARABILITY OF THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES FROM
THE ISSUE OF LIABiLiTY. - Plaintiff was prosecufed under federal criminal
laws for using the mails and instruments of interstate transportation in an
alleged conspiracy to defraud the defendant and others in transactions
involving oil properties and a gasoline plant. Following acquittal, plain-
tiff instituted a civil action for malicious prosecution. During trial, plain-
tiff, a doctor, attempted to show injury to his professional reputation and
standing. Further, plaintiff proved without dispute that, in contesting the
criminal action, his attorneys' fees and other necessary expenditures ex-
ceeded $19,000. Under Tennessee law, attorneys' fees and other expenses
incurred in defending a criminal action are proper elements of damages
in a civil action for malicious prosecution. Miller v. Martin, 10 Tenn.
App. 149 (1929). The jury found for plaintiff and awarded compensatory
damages of $500.00 and punitive damages of $1.00. Judgment was ren-
dered on the verdict; motion for new trial denied. On appeal, plaintiff
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
attacked the inadequacy of the amount and asked for a new trial on the
single issue of damages. Held, judgment as to compensatory damages set
aside and new trial ordered upon that issue only. Since the verdict was
less than the amount of the undisputed loss shown, the motion for new
trial should have been granted; inasmuch as the amount of damages has
no probative connection with the issue of liability, the sole issue to be
retried is that of damages. Devine v. Patteson, 242 F.2d 828 (6th Cir.
1957).
The federal rules of civil procedure permit a new trial limited to those
issues incorrectly determined. FED. R. Civ. P. 59 (a). See 3 BARRON AND
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1307 (1950). At com-
mon law, such procedure was usually not permitted. See 39 AM. JUR.,
New Trial § 21; e.g., Hyler v. Heyer, 177 Misc. 68, 29 N.Y.S.2d 233
(1941). Since the verdict was but 1/40 of the actual losses, the majority
held it was inadequate. The dissent readily admitted the inadequacy but
was persuaded that the verdict, inconsistent on its face, was one of com-
promise; that is, not all the jurors believed that plaintiff was liable and
had settled on the smaller amount merely to reach a decision.
The submission of a case for redetermination of a single issue con-
fronted Anglo-American courts for centuries, but was resolved in the
federal system by Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283
U.S. 494 (1931), where the court held that a new trial of a single issue
would not violate the right of trial by jury because all the issues had once
been decided by a jury. Only those issues erroneously decided need be
retired. A new trial on a lone issue is permitted provided that the issue is
clearly distinct and singular. In cases where the various issues are so inter-
woven that they cannot be separated the new trial must be on all issues.
Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., supra; Southern Ry. Co.
v. Madden, 235 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 953
(1956); Bass v. Dehner, 21 F. Supp. 567 (D.N.M. 1937). A few states
will not allow a new trial upon a single issue, but hold that all questions
must be relitigated. E.g., Stout v. Oliveira, 153 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941); Hyler v. Heyer, supra.
Where the verdict is excessive, federal and some state courts readily
permit retrial of a single issue of damages. Southern Ry. v. Neese, 216
F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 350 U.S. 77 (1955);
Scuddy Mining Co. v. Couch, 295 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. 1956). There is no
problem in the excessive verdict case for plainly, the jury has affirmatively
found liability. Although new trials on the single issue of damages have
been granted where damages were inadequate, Chesevski v. Strawbridge
& Clothier, 25 F.Supp. 325 (D.N.J. 1938); Borgstede v. G. H. Wetterau
& Sons, 337 Mo. 1205, 116 S.W.2d 179 (1938), it is in this area that
serious conflict arises since an inadequate verdict is closely associated
with a compromise verdict. The jury may genuinely determine liability,
yet award inadequate damages. A compromise verdict is one in which
some jurors have conceded liability against their judgment in order to
arrive at agreement with the rest of the jury, the concession given in re-
turn for a reduction in the estimate of damages. Padayao v. Severence,
116 N.J.L. 385, 184 AtI. 514 (1936); Murray v. Krenz, 94 Conn. 503,
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109 Ati. 859 (1920). A compromise verdict is actually no verdict as the
issue of liability has not been determined:
Such a verdict cannot be divided into good and bad. It cannot be sanctioned
in respect to the issue of negligence and set aside as to that of damages with
a new trial limited to the latter question. Bass v. Dehner, supra at 568.
In each case separability of issues is determined from the trial record,
and the question of new trial is ordinarily within the wide discretion of
the trial court. Fairmont Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474
(1933). Granting a partial new trial on the issue of damages is also within
this discretion, and the decision of the trial judge should not be upset on
appeal unless that discretion has been abused. Fortier v. Newman, 78
N.W.2d 382 (Minn. 1956). While the discretion of the trial court should
not be upset on appeal unless its findings are wholly unwarranted, Sund-
gren v. Leiker, 180 Kan. 617, 305 P.2d 843 (1957), that argument is in-
apposite in this instance because the appellate court felt free to upset the
findings of the trial court on the single issue of damages.
Three principal approaches have been utilized by the courts in deter-
mining whether or not an inadequate verdict is one of compromise.
Washington holds that where there is a general verdict, the new trial must
be on all the issues, but where the verdict is special the new trial may be
confined to those issues incorrectly decided. Cramer v. Bock, 21 Wash.2d
13, 149 P.2d 546 (1944). In Tennessee, paucity of the verdict indicates
compromise, because the jury must doubt either the defendant's liability
or the proof on the extent of the plaintiff's injuries. If the defendant has
not conceded liability, the new trial must be on all issues. W. T. Grant Co.
v. Tanner, 170 Tenn. 451, 95 S.W.2d 926 (1936). California decisions in-
dicate that nominal awards for general damages or inadequate verdicts for
special damages strongly evidence a compromise. E.g., Hamasaki v.
Flotho, 39 Cal.2d. 602, 248 P.2d 910 (1952). If the damages pleaded
were only general and the verdict was inadequate, the new trial may be
limited to the 'single issue of damages. Hughes v. Schwatz, 51 Cal. App.2d
362, 124 P.2d 886 (1942). The failure of the verdict to include undis-
puted medical expense and loss of earnings sufficiently indicated com-
promise to the court in Murphy v. Wilson, 141 Cal. App.2d 538, 297 P.2d
22 (1956).
The California approach is most satisfactory where actual damages are
uncontested and the amount of the verdict is less than that proven, since,
excepting the element of credibility, the jury returns a verdict necessarily
inconsistent with the evidence. All issues in the instant case should have
been relitigated because the uncontested actual damages were $19,000 and
the award for compensatory damages was but $500. See Hughes v.
Schwatz, supra. Analogically, uncontested damages are equivalent to the
proven special damages of a negligence action, i.e., loss of earnings, and
medical expenses. See Davison v. Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co., 144 F.
Supp. 599 (W.D. Pa. 1956). The attempted distinction by the majority
that analogies from personal injury cases are inapplicable, since the issues
of damages and liability are more interwoven there, falls short of hitting
the mark; it should be enough that the verdict returned is inconsistent
with the evidence-to inquire into the possible grounds of compromise
1957]
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verdicts in personal injury cases, as did the majority, is only to speculate.
Where there is evidence to suspect that the inadequate damages were the
result of compromise, such doubt should be resolved in favor of a new
trial on all issues (liability and damages). See Sayegh v. Davis, 56 R.I.
375, 128 At. 573 (1925). Under any of the three above mentioned ap-
proaches, a new trial should have been ordered on all issues.
R. L. Cousineau
COURTS-INJUNCTION-COURT MAY NOT ENJOIN THE USE OF SE-
CRETLY RECORDED CONVERSATIONS BY LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING BODY.
-Plaintiffs, an attorney and his client, sought to enjoin a New York Legis-
lative committee from divulging the contents of a secretly recorded con-
versation. The recording allegedly contained a confidential communication
between the attorney and his client taken without their knowledge or con-
sent, in a prison's counsel room. The committee planned to use the record-
ing at a public hearing concerning the client's parole violation. The appel-
late division, reversing the trial court, denied plaintiff's motion for an in-
junction pendente lite and granted defendants' cross motion to dismiss.
On further appeal, held, affirmed, three judges dissenting. A court is
powerless to restrain a legislative investigating body from disclosing, at a
public hearing, secretly recorded confidential communications between an
attorney and his client. Lanza v. New York State Joint Legislative Comm.,
3 N.Y.2d 92, 143 N.E.2d 772, cert. denied, 78 Sup. Ct. 85 (1957).
Two competing policies confronted the court. While the entire court
agreed that interference with the client's right to confer privately with
counsel was repulsive and repugnant, the majority decided that the
issuance of an injunction would be an infringement by the judiciary upon
the legitimate power of the legislature. Plaintiffs claimed that the dis-
closure of the recording would violate the attorney-client privilege,
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 353, and would impair plaintiff Lanza's constitu-
tional right to counsel.
The statute restates the common law privilege relating to confidential
communications between attorney and client. Historically, the privilege
was created at common law in order to dispel a client's apprehension of
the attorney's compelled disclosure of their confidential consultations. 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (3d ed. 1940). The statute prohibits an at-
torney, and his employees, from disclosing confidential communications
from a client unless the privilege has been waived by the client. N.Y.
Crv. PRAC. ACT § 353. But, known presence of a third person during the
meeting, not an agent of client or attorney, may vitiate the privilege.
Doheny v. Lacy, 168 N.Y. 213, 61 N.E. 255 (1901). It has been held
that it is the attorney and the client who are incompetent to testify and
that the communication itself is admissible. Erlich v. Erlich, 278 App.
Div. 244, 104 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dep't 1951); accord, Clark v. State, 159
Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339 (1953). However, the factual situation
in Lanza is unlike the usual case in which a third person has overheard
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the conversation. There was no third person present, merely an electronic
device, the presence of which was unknown; further, the testimony
sought to be enjoined was not that of a third person, but a transcription
of the actual conversation between the plaintiffs. The majority ignored
these distinctions, and implied that the presence of the recording device
was tantamount to the presence of a third party. 143 N.E.2d at 775.
Together with the above, the majority narrowly construed N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. AcT § 354: "The last three sections apply to any examination of a
per son as a witness .... ." 143 N.E.2d at 774. (Emphasis supplied by
court.) It then found that the statute did not create a right to prevent
disclosure when neither the attorney nor the client is examined as a
witness. But the underlying purpose of the statute is to protect the con-
fidence reposed in the attorney as well as to enhance the professional
relationship between attorney and client. See Baumann v. Steingester, 213
N.Y. 328, 107 N.E. 578 (1915). The decision in the instant case fails to
recognize the purposes of the privilege in that the court applies techni-
calities inappropriate where a secretly recorded conversation has been
made. Cf. People v. Cooper, 307 N.Y. 253, 120 N.E.2d 813 (1954).
Plaintiffs' second contention - that a violation of the right to counsel
- involved the perennial problem of abusive investigatory methods em-
ployed by legislative committees. The majority agreed that plaintiff Lan-
za's right to confer privately with counsel had been violated, but refused to
grant a remedy, distinguishing the mode of obtaining information from
the manner of its use. If the recording were to be used in a criminal trial
or proceeding against Lanza, his contention would have been well-found-
ed. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 926 (1952); People v. Cooper, supra. However, the mijority
held that since this recording was "used" by the legislative committee,
whose findings were to bind no one, in the pursuit of a legitimate legisla-
tive object, action by the court would be a usurpation of a legislative
function.
The majority relied upon Hearst v. Black, 87 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
There a Senate committee was allowed to use and disclose certain tele-
grams illegally seized, upon the theory that "legislative discretion in dis-
charge of its constitutional functions, whether rightfully or wrongfully
exercised, is not subject for judicial interference." Hearst v. Black, supra
at 71; but see Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
The exceedingly broad language of the Hearst case must be taken with
some qualification. Although no one denies the legislature is as much the
guardian of the liberties of the people as the courts, legislative committees
are not omnipotent. See Taylor, Judicial Review of Legislative Investiga-
tions, 29 NoTRE DAME LAW. 242, 252 (1954). The illusion that legisla-
tive committees of the federal government were not subject to the first
Ten Amendments in the treatment of a witness has been effectively oblit-
erated. E.g., Watkins v. United States, supra at 188; Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
The minority in the instant case felt that the committee's use of the
recording would be a violation of plaintiff's constitutional right to confer
privately with his attorneys. They would extend this right not only to a
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criminal trial or proceeding against him, but also to a legislative com-
mittee's investigation. This step the majority refused to take. The manner
in which legislative investigating committees have abused witnesses un-
fortunate enough to testify before them has been decried. See Legislative
Investigations: Safeguards for Witnesses - A Symposium, 29 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 157 (1954). The conflict between investigative power and
constitutional rights is highlighted by a recent attempt to strip the Supreme
Court of appellate jurisdiction in subversion and congressional contempt
cases. S. 2646, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1258 (1957). In order to function
properly, investigative committees must have considerable freedom of
action but this necessity imports no license to abuse witnesses. It cannot
be denied that the reputations of innocent witnesses have been greatly
harmed by the adverse publicity resulting from these investigations. See
Watkins v. United States, supra.
It is submitted this court has unwisely refused to grant a remedy where
an individual's right to private consultation with his attorney was im-
minently endangered through an overly timorous regard for legislative
functions. Compare Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (political
question). The litigant is asked to look to the legislature for his remedy,
or, in other words, to his anticipated violator for aid to prevent the vio-
lation.
William J. Harte
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - FAILURE TO PRESENT FORMAL EVI-
DENCti OF AGE WHERE AGE IS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CRiME.-Petitioner
was convicted of armed robbery under a statute which provides that the
accused must have been at least sixteen years of age at the time of the
crime. IND. ANN. STAT. 10-4709 (1956). At the trial no formal evidence
was adduced by the prosecution as to the age of the defendant. He was
identified by witnesses, but never took the stand to testify. The jury was
instructed that they could determine the age of the defendant from their
observation of him during the trial. Defendant was convicted, the jury
finding that he was thirty-eight years of age. On appeal, held, reversed.
Mere identification of a defendant before a jury, without further evidence
of age, is insufficient proof of age where that is an element of the crime;
obesrvation of defendant by the jury does not satisfy the requirement of
proof. State v. Watson, . . . Ind. . ., 140 N.E.2d 109 (1957). -
While the decision required that the prosecution establish the material
element of age by means more formal than mere identification of the
defendant and observation of him by the jury, it rejected an early Indiana
case, Stephenson v. State, 28 Ind. 272 (1867), which held that the ap-
pearance of an accused could not be used under any circumstances. The
decision reflects two fundamental concepts inherent in Anglo-American
criminal law: the burden of the prosecution, 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL
EViDENCE 19 (12th ed. 1955), and the presumption that the accused is
innocent until guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, id. at 183.
When the clearly established intent of the legislature is that no person
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under the designated age is to be convicted under the statute, the state is
bound to establish age by substantive evidence. See Quinn v. People, 51
Col. 350, 117 Pac. 996 (911); Commonwealth v. Walker, 33 Pa. Super.
167 (1907).
The usual presentation of evidence on the question of age, i.e., by
document or testimony, avoids difficulties which would inhere if the jury
were allowed to base findings of material fact upon its informal observa-
'tions. During trial of the instant case defense counsel was not given
notice that the appearance of the accused was to be used as evidence.
Consequently, there was no opportunity for the defense to controvert the
question of age. Commonwealth v. Walker, supra. Where there is a close
question of age the lack of evidence other than the appearance of the
defendant coupled with an instruction similar to that given by the trial
court in the instant case might seriously prejudice the defense. Even
where appearance is properly put into evidenbe it is entitled to little
weight in a close case as to the question of age. Quinn v. People, supra;
Commonwealth v. Walker, supra. If the appearance of defendant is
brought in as evidence of age, it should be so indicated during the course
of testimony so that the jury may uniformly consider the appearance of
the accused. Chance observation will not then control the verdict.
However, the failure of defense counsel to make timely objection has
been held to be a waiver of the deficiency. See People v. Cruz, 113 Cal.
App. 522, 298 Pac. 556 (1931). Here the length of a gun was material
to the crime. The weapon itself was identified, but the prosecution failed
to elicit any testimony as to length. The jury was allowed to base a con-
viction on their observations of the gun during the course of the trial.
The appellate court criticized such a procedure but refused to reverse
since defense counsel failed to object in the trial court. Thus casual ob-
servance by the jury provided the basis for a decision on a material ele-
ment of the crime. The defendant should be convicted under methods
more certain than whether or not his counsel apprehends the failure of
proof.
In the context of the instant case, the prohibition against observation
by the jury as a substitute for proof of a material element of the crime
is correct, but it is necessary and inevitable that the jury be allowed
to rely upon their observations when determining credibility of witnesses
during the trial. Boykin v. People, 22 Col. 496, 45 Pac. 419 (1896);
State v. Hutchinson, 95 Iowa 566, 64 N.W. 610 (1895). In the area of
credibility it has even been held that the jury has a duty to observe the
conduct of a witness while not on the stand. Henriod v. Henriod, 198
Wash. 567, 89 P.2d 222 (1938); Walker v. United States 179 Fed. 810
(8th Cir. 1910).
Where the jury has been instructed that they are allowed to base find-
ings upon informal observations during the trial, the propriety of the
instruction is dependent upon the nature of the anticipated finding, i.e.,
whether it will establish a substantive element of the crime or will deter-
mine the credibility of witnesses. In the former instance the instruction
is improper for it leads to possibilities of prejudice against the defendant
and conviction by casual observation, thus relieving the prosecution of the
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burden of proving every essential element of the crime. In the latter
instance, the instruction is proper, for the jury in determining credibility
must necessarily observe the demeanor of the witness in an informal
fashion.
William D. Bailey, Jr.
STATUTES - INTERPRETATION - RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS HELD
INAPPLICABLE TO FALSE PRETENSE STATUTE. - Defendant bought a
shotgun, falsely representing himself to be one Clyde Dukes. The sales-
man, after checking Dukes' credit, released the gun to defendant who
signed Dukes' name to an invoice. Defendant was convicted under the
following statute: "Whoever . . . by ... any false pretense . . . obtains
from any person . . . any money, or the transfer of any bond, bill, re-
ceipt, promissory note, draft, or check, or thing of value, . . . shall, on
conviction, be imprisoned.. ." IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-2103 (1956). The
defendant contended that the rule of ejusdem generis should be applied
to this statue, limiting the meaning of the phrase "thing of value" to
a species of commercial paper. On appeal, held, affirmed. Ejusdem generis
is not applicable and therefore a shotgun is included within the meaning
of "thing of value." Woods v. Indiana. . . . Ind. . . . 140 N.E.2d 752
(1957).
The rule of ejusdem generis is a rule of statutory construction which
states that where there are general words of classification which follow an
enumeration of particular and specific items, the general words are
applicable only to things of the same kind as those enumerated in the
preceding particular classes. Walling v. Peav-Wilson Lumber Co., 49 F.
Supp. 846 (W.D.La. 1942). In the instant case, the general phrase "thing
of value" followed the words "bond, bill, promissory note, draft or
check." The rule is but a guide in ascertaining the true intent enacting
legislature, United States v. McMenamin, 58 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa.
1944), so that if the court feels the intent was to have the generality
mean literally what it says without the silently implied "of the same kind,"
the rule will not be applied. City of Lexington v. Edgerton, 289 Ky. 815,
159 S.W.2d 1015 (1941).
The rule of ejusdem generis is based on the inference that the legisla-
ture would not have mentioned particular classes if it intended the general
words to be used in their unrestricted sense. In Re Bush Terminal Co., 93
F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1938). Without the rule, criminal laws and those
relating to criminal process could be dangerously vague; State v. Brant-
ley, 201 Ore. 637, 271 P.2d 668 (1954); State v. Certain Contraceptive
Materials, 126 Conn. 428, 11 A.2d 863 (1940); the legislature's attempted
use of general words to close loopholes may result in the courts' exten-
sion of the law's application beyond its intended limits.
Since it is a restrictive rule, it is especially appropriate in the inter-
pretation of penal statutes, People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880, 156 P.2d 7
(1945), because penal laws are to be interpreted strictly in favor of the
accused. United States v. Resnick, 299 U.S. 207 (1936). On the other
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hand, if the particular enumeration exhausts all the possibilities within a
class so that the general words must include other classes or become
nugatory, it must be presumed the legislature intended the all inclusive
meaning. Blake v. State, 210 Md. 459, 124 A.2d 273 (1956). Ejusdem
generis is not a rule of mandatory application; its use is restricted by
other rules formulated to discover -legislative intent. State v. Wells, 146
Ohio St. 131, 64 N.E.2d 593 (1945).
In the instant case, the court, while conceding that a shotgun is not
ejusdem generis with "bond, bill, receipt, promissory note, draft or
check," decided that "thing of value" should have an unrestricted mean-
ing and not be limited by the rule to mean some species of commercial
paper. History supports the conclusion of the court. The present false
pretenses statute was reenacted in 1907, IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-2103
(1956), and employed the same enumeration of commercial paper
followed by the general term "thing of value" as had its predecessors
originating as far back as 1852. IND. REV. STAT. 1852, vol. 2, c. 5 § 27.
Although the question of ejusdern generis had never been specifically
raised as an issue under any of the statutes, convictions had been sus-
tained for obtaining by false pretense everything from a team of horses,
Pinney v. State, 156 Ind. 167, 59 N.E. 383 (1901), to jewelry, Chappell
v. State, 216 Ind. 666, 25 N.E.2d 999 (1940). This was sufficient to
justify the court in reasoning that the legislature by its inaction had
condoned an unrestricted interpretation of "thing of value." Continuous
inaction by a legislature over an extensive period raises an implication of
its intent, see United States v. Elgin, Joliet, & Eastern R.R., 298 U.S.
492 (1936), so that where the legislature enacts an old phrase into a new
law or reenacts an old law without any substantial change, it follows that
the legislature intended to incorporate the interpretation placed upon
the words by previous judicial construction. Coates v. United States, 181
F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
Stare decisis and legislative silence then, combine to establish an inter-
pretation binding upon the courts, Heffner v. White, 221 Ind. 315, 47
N.E.2d 964 (1943), even though the court may be in sympathy with a
contrary interpretation. Danis v. New York Central R.R., 160 Ohio St.
474, 117 N.E.2d 39 (1954).
But if it were the intention of the legislature that "thing of value"
should have its broad, general meaning, the question arises why the
legislature, in drafting the statute, used phraseology which at first glance
demands the application of ejusdem generis. The answer lies in the in-
volved history of common law cheat and larceny and the subsequent
enactments of false pretense statutes.
False pretense statues were designed to overcome two substantial
defects of the common law. CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRiMES § 358 (5th
ed. 1952). Obtaining property under false pretenses was not indictable
as a common law cheat unless a false token, measure, or writing was
used, because, without one of these, there was no public fraud or con-
spiracy, but merely a breach of contract. Rex v. Wheatley, 2 Burr. 1125,
97 Eng. Rep. 746 (K.B. 1761). Secondly, there could be no crime of
larceny where the owner intended to pass title in the property, which
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is normally the case in false pretenses situations. See Kellogg v. State,
26 Ohio St. 15 (1874). In addition to these two defects, choses in action
were not considered subjects of larceny since they were only evidences
of rights to property and not property itself. Warner v. Commonwealth,
I Pa. 154 (1845). In view of the existing common law, it would seem
natural that in remedying the first two evils by making the obtaining
of property under false pretenses a crime, the legislature would, with
the same stroke, remedy the third evil and include choses in action as
subjects of this new crime where common law theory would not. This
fact that choses in action were not considered at common law to be
subjects of theft explains the enumeration of specific commercial paper
before the phrase "thing of value." This explanation for the use of the
particular words is more feasible than the one which follows from
appellant's contention, viz., the legislature must have intended to make
choses in action the only subjects of the crime of obtaining property
under false pretenses.
The court's historical analysis is verified by the fact that no one had
raised the issue of ejusdem generis in past cases; the inference is that it had
been a foregone conclusion that all personal property was intended to be
included under the statute. See GILLET (assistant attorney general of In-
diana), CRIMINAL LAW § 276, 296 (1888); State v. Reiff, 14 Wash. 664,
45 P. 318 (1896) (summarily disposing of issue under a similar statute).
The conclusion in the instant case is neither unexpected nor controversial,
but the opinion does bring two principles of statutory interpretation
against each other: ejusdem generis against legislative silence and stare
decisis. Even assuming that the argument for the non-application of
ejusdein generis had not been fortified by the historical analysis of com-
mon law crimes, the court appears to indicate that legislative silence and
stare decisis throughout numerous past convictions would be strong
enought to override an otherwise valid application of that rule.
John E. Kennedy
TORTS - CHARITABLE IMMUNITY - HOSPITAL LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT
ACTS OF EMPLOYEES WHETHER MEDICAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE. - Plain-
tiff, a patient at defendant hospital, was severely burned during an opera-
tion when a flammable antiseptic fluid was applied to the person of the
plaintiff by nurses, employees of the hospital, as a pre-operative measure.
Although the nurses were aware of the combustible qualities of the fluid,
they failed to inspect for contamination the linen upon which plaintiff was
lying. The plaintiff's burns were incurred when fire resulted from the heat
of an electric cautery. The liability asserted against the hospital was pre-
dicated on an independent act or omission of the hospital-employed
nurses, and not on any conduct ordered by the surgeon. There was a ver-
dict and judgment against the hospital on the basis that the doctrine of
charitable immunity was inoperative since the nurses were considered en-
gaged in an "administrative" act. The Appellate Division reversed, finding
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that the nurses were engaged in a "medical" act. 1 App. Div. 2d 887, 149
N.Y.S. 2d 358 (2d Dep't 1956). On appeal to the Court of Appeals of
New York, held, reversed. The doctrine according charitable hospitals im-
munity for the negligence of its employees is no longer fair and just, and
a hospital's liability must be governed by established rules of agency.
Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
The New York Court of Appeals distinguished, in Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), acts
of an employee-nurse ordered by a physician from her acts which related
to hospital administration. In the first instance, the nurse was under the
control of the surgeon and the hospital was not liable for her torts. In the
latter, the principle of respondeat superior applied and the hospital was
considered liable. Courts of New York developed and expanded this de-
cision until the words "medical" and "administrative" became the criteria
for deciding whether or not a hospital was liable for the torts of employ-
ees. Phillips v. Buffalo Gen. Hospital, 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199
(1924); Necolayff v. Genesee Hospital, 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N.Y.S.2d
832 (4th Dep't 1946), afy'd, 296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E.2d 117 (1947); Cadi-
camo v. Long Island College Hospital, 308 N.Y. 196, 124 N.E.2d 279
(1954).
The refinement of the Schloendorff distinction created the problem of
differentiating between "medical" and "administrative" acts. Compare
Necolayff v. Genesee Hospital, supra, with Berg v. New York Soc'y, 286
App. Div. 783, 146 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1st Dep't 1955); Kaps v. Lenox Hill
Hospital, 269 App. Div. 830, 51 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd 57
N.Y.S.2d 843 (1945) and Phillips v. Buffalo Gen. Hospital, supra, with
Iacano v. New York Polyclinic Hospital, 269 App. Div. 955, 58 N.Y.S.2d
244 (2d Dep't 1945), affd mem., 296 N.Y. 501, 68 N.E.2d 450 (1946).
The court in the instant case highlighted this evil as a reason for taking
leave of the non-liability doctrine. There are few acts which hospital
employees perform for patients that do not relate in some manner to
their medical care and treatment. Berg v. New York Soc'y, supra. Thus
few situations exist in which courts could not grant a charitable hospital
immunity simply by deciding that the employee's tort was "medical"
rather than "administrative" in nature.
The scope of decisions in other jurisdictions range from complete im-
munity, Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Board, 203 Ore. 489,
280 P.2d 301 (1955); Dille v. St. Luke's Hospital, 355 Mo. 436, 196
S.W.2d 615 (1946), to complete liability, Ray v. Tuscon Medical Center,
72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951). For instances of qualified immunity,
see Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915);
Simmons v. Wiley Methodist Episcopal Church, 112 N.J.L. 129, 170
At. 237 (1934); Tolchetti v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, 130 Conn. 623,
36 A.2d 381 (1944). The diversity of judicial opinion is partly occasioned
by the variation in legalistic formulae advanced to support immunity.
See President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C.
Cir. 1942).
Regardless of the rationale advanced to substantiate immunity, the
underlying reason is based upon broad grounds of public policy. Haynes
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v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151 (1950);
President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, supra. Policy changes with
the times, and that of one era may not be the policy of another, Land-
graver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Board, supra, and even where im-
munity is denied, the courts admit that public welfare formerly demanded
immunity. Courts find liability only because of an inversion of public
policy, necessitated by changed social and economic conditions. Avellone
v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956); Pierce
v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash.2d 162, 260 P.2d
765 (1953); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, supra.
The dissent in Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, supra, points out that
in the Cleveland area alone there are approximately one hundred chari-
table activities which will be vitally affected in their financial structure
by the change. Yet the supreme court held that public policy toward
charitable institutions had shifted to liability without giving other chari-
ties a chance to controvert the charge. The identical question was re-
cently before the Oregon supreme court. It stated that because the im-
munity policy affected so many charities and had become so firmly
established, the legislature had the right to assume that the rule would
not be changed unless the legislature itself acted. Landgraver v. Emanuel
Lutheran Charity Board, supra at 303. Not only is the authority of the
court to revise public policy drawn in question, but so is the advisability of
eradicating an established policy. The courts of many jurisdictions feel
the public is greatly benefited by immunity, for a substantial number still
grant at least partial immunity to charities. Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29, 142
(1952).
The majority in the instant case emphasizes, as do most courts declar-
ing non-immunity, the effect of liability on the large, efficiently run, well
endowed hospital that can easily afford liability insurance or has other
means to protect itself against destructive liability. Pierce v. Yakima
Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, supra; Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital,
supra; accord, Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55
So.2d 142 (1951). But see, Dille v. St. Luke's Hospital, 355 Mo. 436,
196 S.W.2d 615 (1946) (hospital immune although insured).
The distinction between "medical" and "administrative" acts, developed
from an unwarranted refinement of the Schloendorff rule. was often diffi-
cult to make, and the results were often harsh. While the decision in the
instant case rightly criticizes further use of an almost meaningless dis-
tinction, the extension of tort liability to all charitable hospitals was
unjustified in that the court could not postulate that public policy toward
all charitable hospitals had changed. Perhaps Landgraver v. Emanuel
Lutheran Charity Board, supra, suggests the proper course of action. If a
statement of public policy is to be made, it should be the legislature that
does so, for the court cannot hear representatives of all communities and
charities affected. It is only through public representation that broad
policy can be fairly established.
Daniel W. Hammer
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